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ABSTRACT 
The Byrd Amendment permits US firms that petition successfully for antidumping duties to collect tariff revenues.  
Whether these payments strengthen the duty’s ability to raise price depends crucially on market structure.  In a 
competitive  market  where  domestic  and  imported  goods  are  imperfect  substitutes,  the  payments  are  akin  to  a 
production subsidy and thus undermine the duty’s ability to raise price.  Applying the theory to antidumping duties 
imposed by the United States on catfish imports from Vietnam, a three-equation model estimated using monthly data 
from January 1999 to August 2006 showed the duties to have had a modest yet positive effect on the US price.  
Although the weak price effect is consistent with supply enlargement induced by the payments, our econometric 
results suggest substitution effects coupled with incidence shifting are stronger causal factors.  
Keywords: antidumping, Byrd Amendment, catfish tariff, trade policy 
INTRODUCTION 
Import competing firms in the United States are increasingly turning to antidumping duties as an “easy” 
means  to  gain  protection  (Irwin).    Although  the  reasons  for  this  are  varied  (Zanardi  2004;  Prusa  2005),  a 
contributing factor is the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act passed by the US Congress in October 2000.  
This  Act,  commonly  known  as  the  “Byrd  Amendment”  (BA),  permits  producers  and  processors  who  petition 
successfully for antidumping duties to collect tariff receipts.  The ability to collect tariff receipts provides an added 
incentive to seek protection, and to participate in the petition process (Reynolds 2006). 
  Most studies of BA focus on how the “offset payments” to domestic firms affect producer and consumer 
welfare using imperfect competition models (Collie and Vandenbussche 2005; Evenett 2005; Chang and Gayle 
2006; Falvey and Wittayarungruangsri 2006).  Although such models are appropriate for industrial goods such as 
steel that are the major beneficiaries of BA (Schmitz and Seale, 2004), they have less relevance for agricultural 
products where product differentiation is weak and firms are more numerous.  Indeed, in their study of the effects of 
BA on tariff levels lobbied for by U.S. agricultural groups, Schmitz and Seale (2004) assume a homogenous product 
and  perfect  competition.    Reimer  and  Stiegert  (2006)  note  that  “tests  of  market  structure  and  behavior  in 
international food and agricultural markets…universally find that price-cost markups are small or nonexistent in 
most markets.”  Although zero markups do not preclude oligopoly behavior, Occam’s razor argues for a simple 
market-clearing model.  A test presented later affirms this choice in the context of the present study. 
  The market structure issue is important because BA is properly viewed as a production subsidy since offset 
payments are based on firm output.  A production subsidy under perfect competition implies an outward shift in the 
domestic industry’s supply curve.  The enlarged supply undermines the ability of the duty to raise price.  This is in 
contrast to imperfect competition models where BA is shown to magnify the duty’s effect on price (Evenett 2005). 
In a perfectly competitive market the apparent paradox vanishes because the increase in domestic supply 
induced by BA erodes the price and demand for the foreign good, making foreign producers worse off.  Non-
petitioning  producers  who  are  not  eligible  for  offset  payments  are  also  made  worse  off  if  the  subsidy  effect 
dominates the tariff effect leading to a decline in domestic price. 
The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  determine  the  price  effects  of  antidumping  duties  under  the  Byrd 
Amendment in a competitive market situation.  The analysis differs from Schmitz and Seale (2004) in that the 
domestic and imported goods are treated as differentiated (as opposed to homogenous) products, and the supply shift 
induced by BA is explicitly taken into account.  In addition, empirical evidence is provided using catfish as a case IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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study.  Catfish represents as useful case study in that it shares characteristics with other agricultural products subject 
to antidumping, data exist to measure impacts, and a federal labeling law passed in 2001 to differentiate domestic 
from imported catfish affords the opportunity to test whether such laws are a useful adjunct to antidumping policy. 
The “catfish war” generated national media attention with articles appearing in The New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor, and The Economist discussing the policy and ethical dilemmas posed by 
the dispute.  The dispute was precipitated by a surge in imports of frozen catfish fillets from Vietnam that coincided 
with a period of low farm prices in the domestic market (Table 1).  Although Vietnam’s share of the US frozen fillet 
market at peak imports was less than 13 percent, and frozen fillets account for only a fraction of the total demand for 
US farm output, the domestic industry saw the low and declining price of the Vietnamese product as a threat.  It 
responded by launching a media campaign to differentiate domestic catfish from and the imported product, by 
securing  federal  legislation  requiring  catfish  imports  from  Vietnam  be  labeled  “basa”  or  “tra,”  and  by  filing 
antidumping petitions.  The petitions resulted in an average tariff of 64 cents per pound in 2003 on a base (fob) 
import price of $1.21.  Two years after full implementation of the tariff the fob import price had declined by $0.28 
to $0.93 per pound and the US price had risen by $0.26 to $2.67 per pound.  An ex ante analysis based on a 
simulation model suggested a catfish tariff would have little effect on domestic price owing to the highly elastic 
nature of US demand for imported fish (Kinnucan 2003).  This study tests that prediction by determining the extent 
to which the foregoing price movements can be ascribed to the antidumping measures. 
Table 1.  Catfish Price and Quantity Data, United States, 1999-2005 
Item  Unit  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Vietnam fillet price (fob)    $/lb.  2.04  1.52  1.26  1.29  1.21  1.15  0.93 
US fillet price  $/lb.  2.76  2.83  2.61  2.39  2.41  2.62  2.67 
US tariff  $/lb.  --  --  --  --  0.64  0.61  0.49 
US farm price  $/lb.  74  75  65  57  58  70  72 
Imports from Vietnam  mil. lbs.  2  7  17  10  4  7  17 
US fillet production  mil. lbs.  120  120  115  131  125  122  124 
US farm production  mil. lbs.   597  594  597  631  661  630  601 
Note: fillets and imports are frozen; farm production is liveweight. Source:  Harvey (2006); authors’ computation.  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A critical factor governing the efficacy of the tariff cum subsidy scheme is incidence.  This is shown in 
Figure 1 where in Panel A we isolate the subsidy effect by treating the price of the imported good as temporarily 
exogenous.  With the domestic price of the imported good fixed the tariff’s full burden is borne by foreign producers 
and the tariff has no effect on the demand for the domestic good.  Redistributing the tariff revenue to domestic 
producers causes the domestic supply curve to shift down by the amount of the per-unit subsidy, which places a 
wedge between the producer and consumer price of the domestic good.  The producers’ share of the subsidy wedge 
depends on the price elasticities of supply and demand for the domestic good and will decrease as demand becomes 
less elastic in relation to supply.  Thus, for example, if labeling causes the demand for the domestic good to become 
less price elastic, as shown in Panel A, it will redistribute the benefits of the subsidy in favor of consumers. 
  The role of tariff incidence is shown in Panel B.  The ability of the tariff to increase the demand for the 
domestic good depends on the substitutability of the domestic good for the foreign good, but also on the domestic 
consumers’ share of the tariff wedge.  If import demand is less elastic than import supply, as depicted in Panel B, 
most of the tariff will appear as a rise in the domestic price of the foreign good as opposed to a decline in the foreign 
sellers’ price.  In this instance, and assuming the two goods are substitutes, the induced increase in demand for the 
domestic good will be relatively large.  The added demand increases the equilibrium supply and demand prices for  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 1.  Effects of Antidumping Duty under the Byrd Amendment 
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the domestic good, augmenting the benefit domestic producers receive from the subsidy, but at the expense of 
domestic consumers. 
  Comparing Panels A and B the equilibrium demand price of the domestic good may rise or fall depending 
on whether the tariff effect outweighs the subsidy effect.  In Panel B domestic consumers of the foreign good are 
unambiguously harmed by the tariff/subsidy scheme as they pay more for the imported good.  Domestic consumers 
of the domestic good may be better or worse off depending on the relative strengths of the subsidy and tariff effects.  
If incidence shifting of the tariff is complete, as in Panel A, the subsidy is financed entirely by foreign producers and 
the tariff/subsidy scheme has no effect on domestic consumer welfare.  If tariff incidence shifting is incomplete, as 
in Panel B, the cost of the subsidy is shared with domestic consumers of the foreign product and their welfare 
declines along with the welfare for foreign producers.  The upshot is that the incidence of the subsidy and tariff 
wedges is crucial in assessing policy impact. 
  To measure the impacts indicated in Figure 1 we use an equilibrium displacement model.  The model and 
methods are similar to those used by Alston (1986) to examine the effects of agricultural policy on poultry trade, by 
Metcalf (1992) to examine the effects of environmental regulations on pork trade, and by Kinnucan and Myland 
(2005,  2006)  to  examine  the  effects  of  tariffs  on  salmon  trade.    The  endogenous  variables  in  the  model  are 
proportionate changes in the prices and quantities of frozen catfish fillets in the US market, the product subjected to 
the antidumping duty.  (Hereafter we drop the adjective “frozen.”)  The production subsidy associated with BA is 
treated as endogenous, dependent on the exogenous tariff rate, and level of imports in the post-tariff equilibrium. 
The domestic demand for US fillets is a function of the price for US fillets, the price of Vietnam fillets, the price of 
other goods, and consumer income; the domestic demand for Vietnam fillets is a function of the same variables.  
Therefore, the demand side of the model is represented as: 
  EY EP EP EP EQ
D D
1 3 13 2 12 1 11 1 ι η η η + + + − =             (1) 
  EY EP EP EP EQ
D D
2 3 23 2 22 1 21 2 ι η η η + + − =             (2) 
where the operator x d x dx x E ln / ) ( = = denotes proportionate change.  Subscripts for the quantity (Q) and price 
(P) variables denote source/product (1 = US, 2 = Vietnam, 3 = other); the superscript “D” on the US and Vietnam 
price variables denotes demand prices.  The price of other goods and consumer income (Y) are treated as exogenous.  
The  parameters  ij η and i ι are  price  and  income  elasticities  of  demand,  respectively,  with  the  own-price 
elasticities ii η expressed  as  absolute  values.    Under  the  maintained  hypothesis  that  the  goods  are  normal  and 
substitute for one another, all parameters in (1) and (2) are positive.  Labeling may shift or rotate these curves, an 
issue addressed in the empirical model presented later. 
  The domestic supply of US fillets is a function of the price of US fillets inclusive of the subsidy, herein 
labeled
S P 1 .    The  domestic  supply  curve  is  shifted  by 1 C ,  a  variable  to  represent  factors  that  alter  domestic 
processors’ marginal cost of producing fillets.  Similarly, the domestic supply of catfish fillets from Vietnam is a 
function of the price of Vietnam fillets exclusive of the tariff, herein labeled  . 2
S P  The supply curve for Vietnam 
fillets is  shifted by  , 2 C  a variable to represent factors that alter the  marginal cost of producing and shipping 
Vietnam fillets to the United States.  Therefore, in proportionate change the supply side of the model is represented 
as: 
  1 1 1 1 1 EC EP EQ
S δ ε + =                  (3) 
  2 2 2 2 2 EC EP EQ
S δ ε + =                 (4)   
 where the parameters i ε and i δ are supply elasticities with respect to price and the shift variables, respectively.  In 
this study, the supply curves are assumed to be upward sloping ( i ε > 0). 
  The  antidumping  duty  on  Vietnam  fillets  places  a  wedge  between  the  supply  and  demand  prices  for 
Vietnam fillets as follows: IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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    T P P
S D ⋅ = 2 2   
where  τ + =1 T andτ is the ad valorem tariff rate.  Since the tariff in initial equilibrium is zero, in proportionate 
change the tariff wedge is modeled as: 
  . 2 2 τ + =
S D EP EP                   (5) 
From (5) if the demand price is unaffected by the tariff  τ − =
S EP 2 and the supply price falls by the full amount of 
the tariff.  This is the situation depicted in Figure 1, Panel A.  In general, however, the tariff is split between and rise 
in the demand price and a fall in the supply price such that τ = −
S D EP EP 2 2 . 
  The subsidy introduced by the Byrd Amendment places a wedge between the demand and supply price of 
US fillets as follows: 
      S P P
D S ⋅ = 1 1   
where ς + =1 S and ς is the ad valorem subsidy defined as the ratio of the per-unit subsidy to the supply price.  
Since the subsidy in initial equilibrium is zero, in proportionate change the subsidy wedge is modeled as: 
  . 1 1 ς + =
D S EP EP                   (6) 
 From (6) the ad valorem subsidy is split between a rise in the supply price of US fillets and a fall in the demand 
price such that ς = −
D S EP EP 1 1 . 
  The subsidy is endogenized by setting the subsidy rate proportional to the tariff rate: 
    τ ϕ ς ⋅ =                   (7) 
where  1 0 < <ϕ .  (The implicit assumption here is that the tariff would not generate sufficient revenue to provide a 
proportionate subsidy larger than the proportionate tariff itself.)  
  Equations (1) – (7) contain seven endogenous variables ( , , , 2 1 1
D S D EP EP EP , 2
S EP 1 EQ ,  , 2 EQ andς ) 
and four exogenous variables ( 2 1 3 , , , EC EC EY EP andτ ).   Since only the demand price of US fillets and the 
supply price of Vietnam fillets are observable, we solve for equilibrium in the two markets by setting (1) = (3) and 
(2) = (4) making use of (5) and (6) to eliminate
S EP 1 and
D EP 2 .  Substituting (7) into the resulting equations yields 
the following price relations: 
1
11 1
1
11 1
1
3
11 1
13
11 1
1 12
2
11 1
12
1
) (
EC EY EP EP EP
S D
η ε
δ
η ε
ι
η ε
η
τ
η ε
ε ϕ η
η ε
η
+
−
+
+
+
+
+
−
+
+
=     (8)   
2
22 2
2
22 2
2
3
22 2
23
22 2
22
1
22 2
21
2 EC EY EP EP EP
D S
η ε
δ
η ε
ι
η ε
η
τ
η ε
η
η ε
η
+
−
+
+
+
+
+
−
+
= .    (9)   
The coefficients of τ in (8) and (9) indicate the effect of the tariff on observed prices when the price of the 
competing product is held constant.  With this caveat in mind and focusing first on (9) competitive market clearing 
implies the supply price of Vietnam fillets will fall, but by less than the amount of the tariff.  Incidence depends on 
the relative magnitudes of the supply and demand elasticities for Vietnam fillets, and will bear more heavily on US 
consumers as demand becomes less elastic in relation to supply. 
  The more interesting result is from (8) where the tariff cum subsidy under competitive market clearing is 
shown to have an ambiguous effect on the price of the protected good.  The positive effect predicted by imperfect 
competition models occurs only if the outward shift in the demand curve for US fillets induced by the tariff exceeds 
the outward shift in the supply curve for US fillets induced by the subsidy, i.e.,  1 12 ε ϕ η > .  If the subsidy effect IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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exceeds the tariff effect such that 1 12 ε ϕ η < a tariff under BA has a perverse effect in the sense that the price of the 
protected good falls. 
    Permitting  prices  to  adjust  simultaneously  complicates  the  tariff  effect,  but  does  not  alter  the  basic 
conclusions  derived  from  (8)  and  (9).    The  tariff’s  net  price  effects  are  obtained  by 
setting 0 3 = = = i EC EY EP and solving (8) and (9) simultaneously to yield: 
  τ
η ε ϕε η ε
D
EP
D ) ( 22 2 1 12 2
1
+ −
=               (10) 
  τ
ϕη η ε η η η η
D
EP
S )] ( ) [( 21 22 1 21 12 22 11
2
+ + − −
=          (11) 
where . ) )( ( 21 12 22 2 11 1 η η η ε η ε − + + = D     Under  the  maintained  hypothesis  consumers  are  more  sensitive  to 
changes in own price than to changes in substitute price the composite term  ) ( 21 12 22 11 η η η η − in (11) is positive, 
which  implies  with  upward-sloping  supply 0 > D .    Hence,  in  competitive  equilibrium  a  tariff  under  BA 
unambiguously depresses the supply price of the foreign good and has an indeterminate effect on the demand price 
of the protected good. 
  As expected, “turning off” BA be setting 0 = ϕ  removes the indeterminancy and attenuates the negative 
effect of the tariff on the foreign supply price.  The attenuation occurs because the subsidy depresses the protected 
good’s price, which erodes the demand for the foreign good through second-round or market feedback effects.  This 
backshift in demand is eliminated with subsidy removal.  The upshot is that in a competitive market the Byrd 
Amendment exacerbates the negative effect of the antidumping duty on foreign sellers.  This is in contradistinction 
to Evenett’s (2005) result based on a duopoly model that BA makes the foreign firm better off relative to the 
equilibrium without BA. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To test whether the catfish market exhibits the behavior predicted by the foregoing theory we estimated the 
following three-equation system:          
S
t
D
t k t k k t t t P a P a D a LABEL a TARIFF a a Q , 2 7 , 1 6
5
3 , 2 1 0 , 1 ln ln ln ∆ + ∆ + + + + = ∆ ∑ =
t t t t salmon e Q a Y a P a , 1 1 , 1 10 9 , 8 ln ln ln + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + −             (12) 
t salmon
S
t k t k k t t
D
t P b P b D b LABEL b TARIFF b b P , 7 , 2 6
5
3 , 2 1 0 , 1 ln ln ln ∆ + ∆ + + + + = ∆ ∑ =
t
D
t t livefish t t e P b P b WAGE b Y b , 2 1 , 1 11 , 10 9 8 ln ln ln + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + −           (13)   
t
D
t k t k k t t t
S
t P c D c PRELIM c LABEL c TARIFF c c P , 1 7
6
4 , 3 2 1 0 , 2 ln ln ∆ + + + + + = ∆ ∑ =
t
S
t t t t salmon e P c FREIGHT c ENERGY c Y c P c , 3 1 , 2 12 11 10 9 , 8 ln ln ln ln ln + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + −   (14) 
where  1 ln ln ln − − = ∆ t t t x x x denotes the first-difference operator.  Equation (12) corresponds to the domestic 
demand relation (1); equations (13) and (14) correspond to the price relations (8) and (9).  Equations (13) and (14) 
contain all the information in the structural model (1)-(7) and in this sense equation (12) is superfluous.  However, 
the cross-price elasticity 12 7 η = a indicates the extent to which tariff-induced increase in the Vietnam price will shift 
the demand curve for the US product, which is useful in interpreting the estimated coefficients of (13).  The time 
subscript t denotes months (t =1, 2, …, 92 for January 1999 through August 2006) and the t i e , (i= 1, 2, 3) denote 
random disturbance terms. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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  Previous research indicates the demand for catfish is seasonal, peaking in the Lenten period, and that it 
takes  between  three  and  twelve  months  for  demand  and  prices  to  respond  to  supply/demand  shocks  (Zidack, 
Kinnucan and Hatch 1992; Kinnucan and Miao 1999; Quagraine and Engle 2002).  Accordingly, lagged dependent 
variables are included in (12) - (14) to account for dynamics and quarterly dummy variables are included to account 
for seasonal demand shifts. Specifically,  k D are zero-one variables that represent the first three calendar quarters of 
the year.  Salmon fillets are hypothesized to be the major substitute for catfish frozen fillets.  Hence, the wholesale 
price of salmon fillets, t salmon P , , along with US disposable per capita consumer income, t Y , are included in (12) - 
(14) as demand shifters. 
  The 
D
t P, 1 and 
S
t P . 2   variables  in  these  equations  are  the  prices  of  frozen  catfish  fillets  received  by  US 
processors and Vietnamese exporters to the US, respectively, in month t.  The latter price is f.o.b., i.e., it is the price 
received by exporters before the US duty is paid.  These prices as well as all other monetary variables in the model 
are deflated by the US CPI. 
  The remaining variables are defined as follows:  t Q , 1 is the per-capita quantity of frozen catfish fillets sold 
by US processors in month t;  t TARIFF is a dummy variable that assumes the value of one during the tariff period 
(August 2003 through August 2006) and zero otherwise;  t LABEL  is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 
one during the labeling law period (December 2001 through August 2006) and zero otherwise.  Major cost factors 
for US processors are the price of live fish and labor.  Hence, supply shifters in (13) are defined as  t WAGE , the 
average wage rate for US manufacturing workers in month t, and  t livefish P , , the average price received by US catfish 
farmers in month t.  Major cost factors for Vietnamese processors and exporters are energy and shipping to the 
United States.  Hence, supply shifters in (14) are defined as t ENERGY , the world energy price index in month t, 
and t FREIGHT , the Pacific freight rate index in month t. 
Feenstra (2004, p. 247) argues that under duopoly the antidumping duty must be treated as endogenous.  
The reason is that during the investigation stage, which can last a year or longer, the foreign firm has an incentive to 
raise price so as to lower the duty should the investigation find in favor of the domestic firm.  That is, strategic 
behavior causes the price of the foreign good to increase before the duty is imposed.  Because this strategic behavior 
is ruled out if firms are price takers, to provide an indirect test of the perfect competition model we include a dummy 
variable  t PRELIM that assumes the value of one during the preliminary investigation period (June 2002 through 
July 2003) and zero otherwise. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The system contains four endogenous variables: US quantity, US and Vietnam price, and US farm price.  
Accordingly (12) - (14) was estimated as a system using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that corrects both 
for simultaneous-equation bias and cross-equation correlation in the error terms.  However, Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) estimates are also presented to assess the sensitivity of results to simultaneous-equation bias.  
Prior to estimation we tested for unit-roots using Dickey-Fuller tests.  Results affirmed all series are stationary in 
logarithmic first differences.  First differencing coupled with the presence of lagged dependent variables resulted in 
the loss of the first two observations; hence, estimates are based on 90 observations (March 1999 through August 
2006). 
   Focusing  first  on  the  SUR  estimates,  results  in  general  are  satisfactory  in  that  most  of  the  estimated 
coefficients have the expected sign and Durbin-h statistics indicate a lack of serial correlation (Table 2).  The R
2s are 
higher for US quantity and price (0.56 and 0.58) than for Vietnam price (0.24), as might be expected owing to the 
use of proxy variables in the latter equation.  Overall, the model does a better job of explaining movements in US 
price and quantity than movements in Vietnam price.  Similar conclusions follow from the GMM estimates, which 
will serve as the basis for the remaining discussion indicated otherwise. 
 IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Table 2.  Estimated Demand and Price Relations for Frozen Catfish Fillets, US Market, Jan. 1999-Aug. 2006  
SUR Estimates
    GMM Estimates  Variable 
US Quantity  US Price  Vietnam Price    US Quantity  US Price  Vietnam Price 
Intercept  -0.087 
(-5.12) 
-0.003 
(-1.39) 
-0.030 
(-0.94) 
  -0.091 
(-12.1) 
-0.004 
(-9.51) 
-0.006 
(-0.54) 
TARIFF  0.020 
(1.15) 
0.004 
(2.01) 
-0.048 
(-0.89) 
  0.025 
(3.96) 
0.005 
(8.41) 
-0.098 
(-9.13) 
LABEL  -0.0002 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
0.036 
(0.69) 
  -0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.0002 
(-0.31) 
0.057 
(7.05) 
PRELIM  --  --  -0.0064 
(-0.11) 
  --  --  -0.037 
(-4.73) 
US Price  -2.40 
(-3.75) 
--  4.08 
(3.38) 
  -3.01 
(-6.30) 
--  7.33 
(11.2) 
Vietnam Price  0.11 
(2.20) 
0.013 
(1.95) 
--    0.10 
(6.83) 
-0.013 
(-4.54) 
-- 
Salmon Price  -0.11 
(-1.07) 
0.028 
(2.25) 
-0.12 
(-0.65) 
  -0.09 
(-3.62) 
0.022 
(10.3) 
-0.15 
(-2.61) 
Income  1.49 
(1.92) 
0.16 
(1.61) 
-0.91 
(-0.62) 
  1.60 
(9.92) 
0.11 
(5.11) 
-1.33 
(-3.90) 
Farm Price  --  0.16 
(4.34) 
--    --  0.08 
(2.12) 
-- 
Wage Rate  --  0.25 
(1.61) 
--    --  0.37 
(9.58) 
-- 
Energy Price  --  --  0.18 
(1.02) 
  --  --  0.15 
(3.74) 
Shipping Price  --  --  -1.21 
(-1.72) 
  --  --  -1.57 
(-10.2) 
Lagged US Quantity  -0.49 
(-6.32) 
--  --    -0.48 
(-30.5) 
--  -- 
Lagged US Price  --  0.30 
(3.55) 
--    --  0.44 
(11.9) 
-- 
Lagged Vietnam Price  --  --  -0.400 
(-4.22) 
  --  --  -0.444 
(-16.3) 
Quarter 1  0.194 
(8.93) 
0.006 
(2.06) 
0.016 
(0.40) 
  0.202 
(33.1) 
0.008 
(10.6) 
-0.016 
(1.54) 
Quarter 2  0.023 
(1.24) 
0.002 
(0.94) 
0.041 
(1.07) 
  0.028 
(7.21) 
0.003 
(4.79) 
0.030 
(2.59) 
Quarter 3  0.085 
(4.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
0.032 
(0.88) 
  0.085 
(20.6) 
-0.001 
(-2.01) 
0.041 
(3.22) 
R
2  0.559  0.578  0.237    0.547  0.521  0.135 
Durbin-h  -1.19  -0.08  -0.11    -0.67  0.00  0.44 
s.e. of regression  0.0648  0.0083  0.1222    0.0656  0.0089  0.1301 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios; see text for details. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Demand Equation 
Results suggest US fillets are a superior good in that demand is sensitive both to price and income.  The 
estimated own-price elasticity is -3.01 (t-ratio = -6.3) and the estimated income elasticity is 1.60 (t-ratio = 9.9).  
These elasticities are short run in that they indicate the percent change in quantity in the current month to isolated 
one percent changes in own-price and income in the current month.  The associated long-run elasticities are obtained 
by  dividing  the  short-run  elasticities  by  one  minus  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable 
(Nerlove 1958).  This estimated “adjustment coefficient” is -0.48 (t-ratio = -30.5) yielding long-run elasticities of -
2.03 and 1.08, respectively, for own-price and income.  Thus, the demand for US catfish fillets at the wholesale level 
is less responsive to price and income in the long run than in the short run, perhaps reflecting inventory behavior.  
Over  the  sample  period  processor  inventories  of  frozen  fillets  averaged  70  percent  of  sales  on  monthly  basis, 
providing some scope for meeting short-run increases in market demand by drawing down inventories rather than 
increasing production.     
  Importantly,  US  fillets  are  a  poor  substitute  for  Vietnam  fillets;  the  estimated  short-run  cross-price 
elasticity is 0.10 (t-ratio = 6.8) implying an estimated long-run cross-price elasticity of 0.07.  This suggests tariff-
induced increases in the price of Vietnam fillets will have little impact on the demand for US fillets.  One reason US 
fillets may be a poor substitute for Vietnam fillets is the former’s higher cost: over the sample period the US price 
on average was twice the Vietnam f.o.b. price, $2.63/lb. versus $1.34/lb.  Even with a 60 percent tariff the average 
tariff-inclusive Vietnam price at $2.14/lb. is well below the average US price.  Hence, unless buyers see a significant 
quality difference between the US and Vietnam products, there would be little inducement to switch to the US 
product given the observed price ranges.  The upshot is the tariff is not apt to be effective at raising the US price, as 
is clear from equation (8) when  07 . 0 12 = η . 
  US catfish and salmon fillets are weak complements as evidenced by an estimated short-run cross-price 
elasticity  of  -0.09  (t-ratio  =  -3.6).    Recalling  that  this  is  a  wholesale  level  relationship,  the  complementary 
relationship  may  reflect  menu  offerings  of  institutional  buyers  (especially  restaurants)  as  opposed  to  actual 
substitution  effects  by  final  consumers  at  retail.    In  any  event,  salmon  prices  appear  not  to  be  an  important 
determinant of catfish demand, at least for frozen fillets. 
  The estimated coefficients of the quarterly dummy variables are significant and show the expected pattern, 
namely a heightening in demand during the Lenton period.  Specifically, the estimated coefficient of D1 is 0.202 (t-
ratio = 33.1), which suggests demand in the first calendar quarter is 20 percent higher than in the fourth quarter, 
ceteris paribus.  Demand increases again during the third quarter, albeit by a lesser amount 8.5 percent. 
  The estimated intercept is negative and significant, indicating trend decreases in demand over the sample 
period.  That is, in the absence of changes in relative prices and income the demand for US frozen fillets is expected 
to decline over time, which suggests a weakening in consumer preferences. 
  Turning to the policy variables, the estimated coefficient of TARIFF is 0.025 and significant (t-ratio = 3.96) 
while the estimated coefficient of LABEL is insignificant.  Hence, the labeling law had no effect on the demand for 
US fillets.  The tariff effect, though statistically significant, is not economically significant.  That is, despite the 
tariff’s size (40 - 65 percent depending on the dumping margin assigned to the foreign firm) it shifted the demand 
curve for the US product to the right, i.e., in the quantity direction, by a mere 2.5 percent.  This modest shift is 
consistent with the tiny long-run cross-price elasticity ( 07 . 0 12 = η ) estimated in the same equation. 
US Price Equation 
Consistent  with  the  demand  equation  the  estimated  coefficient  of  TARIFF  is  positive  (0.005)  and 
significant (t-ratio = 8.4) while the estimated coefficient of LABEL is insignificant. Hence, the labeling law was 
futile in that it affected neither the price nor quantity of US fillets.  Although the tariff was effective in that it 
increased US price as well as demand, the price effect was modest, less than one percent.  Recalling the Byrd 
Amendment renders the sign of the tariff coefficient ambiguous (see equation (8)), the positive coefficient suggests 
the tariff effect dominates the subsidy effect, albeit modestly.     
  Estimates of the remaining coefficients are less than 0.5 in absolute value, indicating US price is insensitive 
both to supply and demand shocks and to changes in the Vietnam fillet price.  The most important variable to affect 
the US price is labor costs with an estimated coefficient for  t WAGE ∆  equal to 0.37 (t-ratio = 9.6) followed by IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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consumer income with an estimated coefficient for t Y ∆ equal to 0.11 (t-ratio = 5.1).  These are short-run elasticities.  
The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 0.44 (t-ratio = 11.9) implying long-run elasticities for 
labor cost and income equal to 0.66 and 0.20, respectively.  Increases in farm price and salmon price have positive 
effects on US price, but the effects are modest, with long-run elasticities equal to 0.14 and 0.04, respectively.  
Quagrainie and Engle’s (2002) estimate of the farm-US fillet price transmission elasticity from a VAR model is 
somewhat larger at 0.322.    
  The estimated coefficient for Vietnam price switches from positive in the SUR estimate to negative in the 
GMM estimate, but the estimated coefficients in both cases are tiny, 0.013 and -0.013.  Quagrainie and Engle (2002) 
estimate the same elasticity at -0.004 and insignificant.  Combining these estimates, it appears the Vietnam fillet 
price has had little, if any, effect on the US fillet price.  
Vietnam Price Equation 
The estimated coefficient of PRELIM is significant and negative, indicating the Vietnam price fell during 
the investigation period.  Because the duopoly model discussed by Feenstra predicts foreign price should rise during 
the investigation period, this constitutes evidence in favor of the perfect competition model used here.  That is, there 
is little evidence either in the raw data (see table 1) or in our econometric estimates to suggest Vietnam exporters 
had sufficient market power to raise price during the investigation period to reduce the antidumping duty. 
  The estimated coefficient of TARIFF is -0.098 and significant (t-ratio = -9.1).  Thus, the tariff reduced the 
fob price received by Vietnam exporters, as the perfect-competition model predicts.  The estimated reduction in 
Vietnam price of 9.8 percent is much larger than the estimated increase in US price of 0.5 percent, which suggests 
the tariff did more to punish Vietnam producers than to reward US producers, a finding consistent with Kinnucan’s 
(2003) analysis.  The estimated coefficient of -0.098 suggests 81 percent of the tariff appears as a rise in the US 
consumer price for Vietnam fillets. This implies import demand is less elastic than import supply, which means most 
of the tariff is borne by US consumers rather than Vietnam producers.  Despite the high US incidence, the tariff per 
se (ignoring the subsidy) is not a potent policy instrument as US demand for US fillets is insensitive to the price of 
Vietnam fillets.  In other words, the tariff sans subsidy harms US consumers and Vietnam producers with little in the 
way of benefits for US producers. 
  The  labeling  law  appears  to  have  had  the  unintended  consequence  of  benefiting  Vietnam  producers.  
Specifically, the estimated coefficient of LABEL is 0.057 (t-ratio = 7.1), which suggests the labeling law increased 
the Vietnam price 5.7 percent, ceteris paribus.  The positive effect suggests US buyers value the ability to identify 
source origin.  In this sense the law was not devoid of public benefits. 
  The Vietnam price is highly sensitive to the US price with an estimated coefficient of 7.33 (t-ratio = 11.2).   
The corresponding long-run elasticity, obtained by dividing the short-run elasticity by one minus the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, is 5.01. Quagraine and Engle’s (2002) estimate of the same elasticity is 
3.56.  The asymmetric price response is intuitive given the price advantage enjoyed by the Vietnam product.  Thus, 
while Vietnam price has little effect on US price, the Vietnam price is highly sensitive to the US price, especially in 
the short run when imports are relatively fixed in supply.  For example, assuming a US tariff incidence of 81 
percent, the tariff-inclusive price of Vietnam fillets in 2004 was $1.64 versus $2.62 for US fillets.  If buyers view the 
products as similar in quality, as the positive coefficient for LABEL suggests, an increase in the US price would 
provide a powerful incentive for buyers to switch to the relatively cheaper imported product. 
  Increases in the price of energy raise the price of Vietnam fillets, although the effect is modest with a short-
run elasticity of 0.15 (t-ratio = 3.7).  Vietnam price is negatively related to changes in income, shipping costs, and 
salmon price.  The negative coefficient  for salmon price suggests imported catfish and salmon and catfish are 
complements, which may reflect the fact that fish buyers at wholesale handle both products and imports constitute a 
significant share of US salmon consumption (Kinnucan and Myrland 2005).  The quarterly dummy variables suggest 
a seasonal pricing pattern opposite the US pattern with a strengthening in the Vietnam price during the third quarter 
when  the  US  price  is  weakening  and  vice-versa  during  the  first  calendar  quarter.    This  suggest  imports  are 
responsive to seasonal shifts in domestic supply and demand, which may explain the lack of seasonal price variation 
for frozen fillets found in Quagraine and Engle’s study. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A basic theme of this research is the Byrd amendment renders the domestic price effect of an antidumping 
duty indeterminate owing to the implicit production subsidy.  Thus, there is little reason to expect the price of the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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protected good to rise following imposition of the duty as the upward pressure on price associated with the tariff is 
offset by the downward pressure on price associated with the subsidy.  Indeed, in the case of catfish we found the 
antidumping duties of between 40 and 60 percent imposed by the United States between 2003 and 2006 on frozen 
catfish fillets imported from Vietnam raised the US price of frozen fillets by less than one percent.  
Although  it  is  tempting  to  attribute  the  modest  price  effect  to  enlarged  supply  induced  by  the  Byrd 
payments, our econometric estimates suggest weak demand-side effects coupled with incidence shifting may be at 
play.  Specifically, the cross-price elasticity of demand of US fillets with respect to Vietnam price is estimated at 
less than 0.10, and 19 percent of the tariff is estimated to have been absorbed by Vietnam producers in the form of a 
lower export price.  This tariff “leakage” coupled with the minute cross-price elasticity implies the shift in the 
demand curve for US fillets associated with tariff was modest.  Indeed, the demand equation estimated in this study 
placed the demand shift at less than three percent. 
It appears, therefore, that in the absence of the Byrd Amendment, which permitted the domestic industry to 
collect some $9.2 million in tariff revenues over the sample period, equivalent to 3 percent of wholesale value, the 
antidumping  duty  yielded  little  in  the  way  of  benefits  for  domestic  producers.    And  what  benefits  that  were 
generated came at the expense of domestic consumers and foreign producers.  This conclusion is consistent with a 
growing  body  of  evidence  that  suggests  antidumping  and  countervailing  duties  are  impotent  instruments  of 
protection for farm products (Asche 2001; Brester, Marsh, and Smith 2002; Kinnucan 2003; Kinnucan and Myrland 
2005). 
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